Text passwords-a frequent vector for account compromise, yet still ubiquitous-have been studied for decades by researchers attempting to determine how to coerce users to create passwords that are hard for a ackers to guess but still easy for users to type and memorize. Most studies examine one password or a small number of passwords per user, and studies o en rely on passwords created solely for the purpose of the study or on passwords protecting low-value accounts. ese limitations severely constrain our understanding of password security in practice, including the extent and nature of password reuse, password behaviors speci c to categories of accounts (e.g., nancial websites), and the e ect of password managers and other privacy tools.
INTRODUCTION
Text passwords are ubiquitous and have been a topic of interest for usability and security researchers for many years. Researchers have reported for decades that users, despite good-faith e orts and interest in the security of their information, struggle to comply with password creation and management guidelines [1, 22, 31] and fail to create secure passwords [20, 36, 46] . As the number of accounts per user and the amount of data protected by passwords increases, so does the motivation for password-cracking a acks. To protect against these a acks, modern password guidelines suggest that passwords should be at least eight characters in length, should not contain common and easily-guessed words [19] , should contain multiple character types, and, ideally, should be randomly-chosen [17] . Furthermore, users should create distinct passwords-all meeting these complexity requirements-for all of their accounts [48] . Given the complexity required by modern password advice, combined with the number of accounts that a frequent Internet user possesses, password management places unrealistic demands on human memory [4, 43] .
Researchers have sought to understand users' current password management strategies and limitations to inform the design of secure systems and interfaces that account for the human in the loop [25] . However, many of these studies have depended on selfreports in surveys or on other indirect measurements [21, 42, 46] , or have solely focused on one password per user, such as the passwords revealed in password leaks from a particular website [33] or passwords speci cally created for a study [30, 52, 54] . e ability to examine all of the passwords individual users use in their daily online activities, as well as the broader context in which they are used, is critical to understanding important security properties, such as the extent to which users reuse their passwords, how much of a password users reuse, whether users understand the concept of higher-and lower-value accounts, and to what extent password managers improve the strength or usability of passwords.
To date, there have been few quantitative in situ studies that encompass all or most of a user's passwords. Most notable is Wash et al. ' s eld study that investigated password behaviors captured over six weeks from the daily online activities of 134 participants [50] . Unlike previous work, this study was able to investigate how people reuse passwords across di erent websites. ey found that their participants reused each of their passwords for 1.7-3.4 websites.
ey also found that passwords that were entered frequently or that were more complex were reused more o en. While providing valuable insights, the study did not examine the degree to which people partially reuse passwords, e.g., by creating a "new" password by appending a digit to an old one. Furthermore, their use of entropy as a proxy for password strength leads to the question of whether their ndings hold for other measures of password strength. In this paper we describe a comprehensive, longitudinal, in situ study of passwords and password behaviors. In particular, leveraging an ongoing longitudinal study of multiple user behaviors called the Security Behavior Observatory (SBO) [14, 15] , we examinewith careful a ention to privacy and approval from our ethics review board-the password use information and hashed passwords of 154 participants over an average of 147 days (21 weeks). We also collect a wide range of computer usage information, ranging from the presence of password managers and web browser privacy extensions to the presence of malware and update status of so ware on each participant's computer.
More speci cally, to examine how passwords and parts of passwords are reused across accounts, participants' web browsers were instrumented to compute and store the hash values of passwords and of three-character-or-longer substrings of passwords that participants entered into any web site. Before hashing the passwords, the browser recorded the length, entropy, domain on which it was used, and counts of each character type for each password observed. To measure passwords' resistance to guessing a acks, an open-source client-side neural-network password guesser [35] was deployed to participants' computers, which computed and recorded the strength of each password.
Relying on this data-collection approach, we believe we are able to get a longer, broader, and more accurate look than has previously been possible at the characteristics of passwords and at password behaviors across the full range of participants' web-based accounts. In particular, our sample is more diverse than the Wash et al. [50] sample, which was made up entirely of university students, and we also examine partial reuse. Furthermore, our analyses use a more accurate strength measurement than Shannon entropy used by Wash et al. Additionally, the SBO dataset allows us to correlate password behavior to other security behavior.
We used this data to further explore the occurrence of password reuse in our participants' everyday online activities. Speci cally, we a empt to address questions such as: To what extent do users partially reuse passwords across websites? Are there certain attributes of a password that correlate with more or less reuse? Are stronger passwords used di erently than weaker ones? Are there clusters of users that are similar in their password reuse habits? Are there passwords that are similar to each other in how they are used and constructed? Do participants' engagement in other password security behaviors serve as possible predictors of password strength and password reuse?
Our analysis revealed several insights into how people use passwords in their daily activities. We found that passwords that included digits and special characters were more likely to be reused on multiple sites. Passwords used on job-or work-related sites or on shopping sites were also more likely to be reused. Contrary to Wash et al.'s ndings [50] , we found that stronger passwords were less likely to be reused and that the frequency with which a password was entered did not a ect its likelihood of reuse.
Additionally, among exactly-or partially-reused passwords, passwords used on educational, nancial, government, or "portal" websites tended to be reused on fewer total domains. Longer passwords, if reused, also tended to be reused on fewer domains. Reused passwords containing digits, however, tended to be reused on more total domains.
Furthermore, our analysis revealed that the use of password managers or auto ll functions did not have discernible e ects on password reuse or password strength and that a number of other security behaviors that we observed are not reliable indicators of reuse. We also observed that users can be grouped into a handful of behavioral clusters, representative of various password strength selection strategies, suggesting that once a user needs to start managing a large number of passwords, they cope by reusing-both partially and exactly-across multiple websites. e remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we provide an overview of prior work studying password strength, password guidance, and password behaviors. In Section 3, we then describe the details of our longitudinal study and data collection. We present our results in Section 4, describing our analysis of user behavior pa erns, methods for clustering groups of users and passwords, and models for predicting reuse. In Section 5, we discuss the implications of our ndings.
RELATED WORK
Text passwords have been the de facto standard for authentication between end-users and computer systems since the 1960s [34] . In the intervening 50 years, numerous researchers have shown how user errors stemming from poor usability (e.g., use of low entropy passwords, poor storage habits, memory lapses, etc.) result in poor security [1, 26, 29, 36] . Despite their known shortcomings, passwords are still in widespread use and are unlikely to go away at any point in the immediate future [24] . us, the focus of this paper is on the use of text-based passwords; we consider prior work on alternatives to text-based password authentication (e.g., graphical passwords, biometrics, etc. [4] ) to be out of scope.
Given the acknowledged permanence of textual passwords [23] , our goal is to be er understand how people use and make decisions about them in situ so that authentication systems can be be er designed around human limitations. Towards accomplishing that goal, we use this section to outline prior research that has been performed to be er understand what constitutes a strong password in light of modern a acks, how to guide users towards selecting stronger passwords, and how users currently use passwords.
Password Strength
Ever since Morris and ompson's seminal work on password cracking [36] , there has been an arms race to increase password strength beyond an a acker's ever-increasing ability to crack passwords. ese e orts must rely on quanti able de nitions of password strength, which continues to be an elusive term to de ne. For instance, one naïve approach is based on Shannon entropy [40] :
Here, the entropy of a password is de ned in bits as a function of the character classes used (c = 26 for only lower case le ers, 52 for upper and lower case le ers, 62 for alphanumeric passwords, etc.) and its length (l). NIST guidelines from 2006 use this formula as a starting point for estimating the password strength of user-generated passwords of di erent lengths. e guidelines use heuristics to assign entropy values to each character in a password string. However, the guidelines warn that the formula should only be taken as "a rough relative estimate of the likely entropy of user chosen passwords" [5] .
Of course, we know that in practice a password such as "password1, " which can be easily guessed by a cracker with knowledge of the distribution of users' password choices, is much weaker than "s723ja0xp" (the naïve entropy approach estimates both as being 46.5 bits). In the past decade, several high pro le data breaches have provided researchers with the data to refute this approach. For instance, Weir et al. showed this by examining several million passwords that were leaked from various major websites [51] . One key insight from this research is that passwords are not chosen randomly, and therefore strength should be calculated based on how similar one password is to another. Schechter et al. proposed using "popularity" as a metric to prohibit the use of various passwords on a system, once they become commonly used, so as to maintain a wide distribution of passwords between all of the system's accounts [39] . Kelley et al. showed that the number of guesses it takes to crack a password can be used as an e ective strength method [27] : they employed this method to compare the relative strengths of passwords created under di ering composition policies. Ur et al. showed that while "guessability" is likely the most e ective metric for password strength, care must be taken since various cracking algorithms will yield varying results based on con guration options and method employed [47] .
us, unless multiple approaches are examined, researchers' estimates of password strength may not accurately generalize to the real world.
Dell'Amico et al. further demonstrated the e ectiveness of certain password guessing techniques in cracking even strong passwords. ey also suggest that there may be a point of "diminishing returns" such that the probability of successfully guessing a password no longer justi es the cost of continuing an a ack [9] . Bonneau examined millions of passwords from a major webmail provider and observed that the most common passwords do not even appear to vary much by language or other demographic factors [3] . He also observed that while having a payment card associated with the account increases password strength (likely due to users rationally pu ing more e ort into mitigating the increased risk of account compromise), these passwords were still highly susceptible to o ine guessing a acks.
Password Guidance
Assuming that well-de ned strength metrics can be agreed upon, how should these be used to promote stronger passwords? Bishop and Klein suggested that password strength be measured at account creation, so that proposed passwords can be proactively checked [2] . Proctor et al. studied this recommendation by enforcing additional composition requirements beyond a minimum length (e.g., adding symbols and numbers), and observed that contrary to expectations, they had a negligible e ect on memorability [37] .
Yan et al. performed a study to examine how di erent types of password advice would result in stronger or weaker passwords, and how this advice would impact memorability [52] . Predictably, they observed that when instructed to either construct a password using a mnemonic phrase or random character assignment, the resulting passwords were signi cantly stronger than those created in the control condition, wherein no advice was given. When it came to measuring memorability, participants who constructed random passwords reported having a much tougher time remembering them, o en resorting to writing them down. ese results were consistent with results earlier work by Zviran and Haga [54] .
Komanduri et al. examined the e ects of di erent composition policies on a large scale [30] : they recruited over 5,000 participants to construct and then a empt to remember passwords constructed under varying minimum requirements. Ultimately, they observed that longer passwords that do not require special characters (e.g., symbols and/or numbers) generally are both stronger and more memorable than shorter passwords with more stringent composition policies. While textual passwords based on word phrases may seem like they embody greater entropy, Kuo et al. showed that with a properly constructed dictionary, they are still susceptible to guessing a acks [32] . Furthermore, Shay et al. demonstrated several usability challenges related to system generated passphrases in comparison to equivalent strength random passwords [41] .
Forget et al. showed that "persuasive technology" could be used to guide users through the process of strengthening their passwords [13] . eir system suggested that users include additional symbols at arbitrary positions. A user study showed signi cant results, though for usability reasons, the authors recommended that systems suggest users add no more than three additional characters.
In addition to composition policies, graphical meters are another way of o ering users password guidance. Ur et al. showed that meters do result in stronger passwords, but that the particular design of the meter is inconsequential [45] . Egelman et al. corroborated these results, but showed that they hold only when users are forced to change a password for an account they perceive as worth protecting [10] . Otherwise, users are likely to simply reuse a password that they use elsewhere.
One shortcoming of meters is that they tend to rely on simple heuristics, rather than actual measures of strength. is leads to inconsistency in the feedback provided on di erent websites [6] . To provide a data-driven approach to password feedback, Melicher et al. constructed a neural network that outputs the number of guesses likely needed to guess a given password [35] . Since it does not have the computational overhead of other guessing approaches, it can be implemented client-side to provide realtime feedback in the form of a strength meter.
Another problem with meters is that when they indicate that a password is "weak, " they o en do not explain what can be done to make it "strong. " Ur et al. used iterative design to create a meter that conveys be er guidance to users and showed it to be e ective [44] .
Up until very recently, experts frequently told users to periodically change their passwords. However, research by Zhang et al. called this practice into question, because "new" passwords are frequently predictable modi cations of "old" passwords [53] . Chiasson and van Oorschot also found in a quantitative analysis that the security bene t of password expiry was "minor at best" and "questionable in light of overall costs" [8] . Florêncio and Herley made the case that most advice o ered to users about passwords is misguided, because it does li le to address current a ack vectors and because be er system administration practices are o en a much more e ective solution [12] .
In 2017, the National Institute of Standards and Technology published new authentication guidelines that di ered from previous guidelines in their emphasis on usability. e new guidelines discourage complex password policies and arbitrary password expiration periods [19] .
Password Behaviors
Confronted with large numbers of passwords, users develop coping strategies. Hayashi and Hong performed a diary study of daily password use in 2011 [21] . From their 20 participants, they observed that participants entered passwords an average of 75 times during a two-week period, which the authors estimated corresponded to over 11 online accounts. eir participants reported using various aids to remember their passwords for around 40% of their accounts. e number of passwords that users are expected to manage has likely increased over the years. For instance, Gaw and Felten performed a study ve years earlier and found that most users had up to three passwords [16] .
In 2007, Florencio and Herley performed arguably the rst largescale study of password behaviors [11] : they instrumented participants' web browsers to record password reuse across websites. ey concluded, based on three months of data collection from half a million users, that the average web user has under seven unique passwords that are each reused across four websites. Since then, others have used large data sets of leaked passwords to examine users' password choices (e.g., [33] ).
Another stream of research lies in gathering qualitative data to be er understand users' methods and a itudes toward password creation [46] . Shay et al. examined 470 university computer users' a itudes about their experiences with more stringent password requirements recently introduced by the university [42] . ey observed that while users were predictably annoyed by the new policies, they ultimately believed that they served the greater good of increasing security. Inglesant and Sasse observed that similar tensions between usability and promoting security occur in the workplace [25] .
Most relevant to our work is a study performed by Wash et al., who instrumented 134 students' web browsers to analyze password usage on the web over a six-week period [50] . eir study provided unique insights into password construction, use, and reuse. We use a similar methodology to answer additional questions about in situ password use among a more generalizable sample. Additionally, our so ware instrumentation allows for a deeper analysis into the password reuse habits of users, with an examination into the reuse of password substrings. Furthermore, we analyze the use of passwords in a broader security context by observing correlations of password reuse and strength with other security behaviors, such as the use of privacy-enhancing browser extensions and password managers.
METHODOLOGY
For our analysis, we use data collected by the Security Behavior Observatory (SBO), a longitudinal study of the security behaviors of Windows computer users [14, 15] .
Study participants use their own home computers, which are instrumented with data collection so ware.
e so ware suite is composed of system-level processes that collect a variety of security-related metadata, including information regarding system con guration, system events, operating system updates, network packets, and installed so ware, as well as browser extensions that collect data including browsing history, browser se ings, and presence of browser extensions.
e data collection so ware is designed to run passively without interfering with users' normal activities. In order to maximize the ecological validity of the study, participants in the SBO are not prompted or instructed to change their behavior in any way beyond what is necessary to install and run the data collection so ware.
e SBO has been recruiting continuously since 2014. Participants may leave the study at any time, so the data collection period varies for each user. e SBO has collected data from approximately 512 machines in the period between fall 2014 and summer 2017 and is currently collecting data from approximately 200 machines.
e SBO protocol is approved by our institution's ethics boards. Participants receive $30 for enrolling as well as $10 per month for participation.
A researcher conducts an enrollment phone call with each participant during which the researcher explains the consent form and study protocol and provides the participant with the opportunity to ask questions. e consent form explains the types of data that may be collected from the computer, including network tra c, input from devices connected to the computer, and interaction with websites. A er the consent process is completed, a researcher assists participants with the installation of the data collection so ware and browser extensions. If there are other users of the computer being enrolled in the study, those users must also complete the consent process before data collection can begin. Each participant is also required to complete a short demographic survey at the time of enrollment.
Data is encrypted in transmission and stored securely on a hardened server accessible only to maintainers and collaborating researchers. Participants may leave the study at any time.
Password Data Collection
In January 2017, we updated the SBO browser extensions for the Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, and Vivaldi browsers. We added functionality to securely collect metrics regarding the use and composition of passwords entered within the browser. To collect all passwords entered by participants, we identi ed every HTML input eld on every browser event (such as clicks, key presses, page loads) and ltered using heuristics to extract unique password submission events. For each password, we collected a salted (one-way) hash of the password text and composition metadata such as character length and number of characters in each character class (uppercase, lowercase, special characters, and digits). Using hashes of the password text allows us to analyze password reuse pa erns and password a ributes without collecting plaintext passwords. In addition to the hashes that permi ed analysis of password reuse, for each password we also collected the length, the number of characters from each character class, hashes of each password's substrings of three or more characters, and a calculated measure of strength.
During the password data collection period that began in January 2017 and ended in July 2017, the SBO has received data from 294 distinct browsers associated with 224 SBO participants. (Other SBO participants either used unsupported browsers such as Internet Explorer or Microso Edge or had technical issues preventing browser data transmission.) Of those 224 participants, we excluded 28 who reported during the consent process that there were other users of their computers. Since we are primarily concerned with understanding individuals' management of their own password portfolios, and particularly individuals' decisions regarding password reuse, we did not want to confound the analysis by receiving passwords from multiple users of the same machine. From the remaining 196 participants, we also excluded 42 who had not had the updated browser extension running for at least 28 days and/or had not sent any password inputs. Ultimately, we analyzed password data from 154 users.
We considered all of the passwords typed by our 154 participants into a web browser running our extension during the study period, with a few exceptions. Since passwords are hashed and salted on a per-browser basis, we were unable to assess reuse of passwords across di erent browsers. If a user sent data from two or more browsers during the observation period, we only considered the user's primary browser, which we identi ed as the one that had sent data on more days. Some cases of duplicate records occur due to unrelated technical issues, since a new browser record may be created if the SBO so ware or the browser is uninstalled and reinstalled, and others occur when users use more than one browser regularly (e.g., using Chrome for certain tasks and Firefox for others). 54 secondary browser records were discarded from 43 participants with multiple browser records. On average, the excluded browsers were used on approximately 26 days during the observation period, whereas the main browsers included in this analysis were used on approximately 84 days. 1 To avoid analyzing mistyped or incorrect passwords, we applied ltering logic to limit each participant to at most one password for each website. (Even if a user changed a password during our data collection period, this logic counted only one password per website.) For each website, we observed the set of all passwords submi ed and selected the password with the highest number of submissions throughout the term of the study. In the case of an equal number of submissions, we then selected the password submi ed on the highest number of days. And in the case both methods failed to distinguish a password, we then selected the password with most submissions across all websites. In the rare case, less than 3% of all passwords, where multiple participant passwords still remained for a website, we selected the most recent of the submissions. is approach is similar to the methodology used by Wash et al. [50] . 1 e browser extensions for the so ware are installed for all browsers installed on the users' computer at the time of enrollment, even browsers that the users report that they do not use.
Password Reuse
We divided password reuse into exact and partial reuse. We identied exact reuse by examining hashes of the full contents of password elds in HTML form elements. If the same hash value appeared across two or more domains for a given user, we considered the corresponding password to be exactly reused. We identi ed partial reuse by computing hashes for all substrings of length four or more in each password. We considered a password to be partially reused if it includes a four-character (or more) substring that also appears in a di erent password belonging to the same user on a di erent domain.
We chose to identify passwords as "partially reused" for this analysis only if they shared a substring of four or more characters in part because we were concerned about identifying coincidental reuse of trigrams that might not constitute meaningful reuse of a signi cant portion of a given password. By limiting partial reuse to only four-character substrings, we may miss some passwords that contain common substrings with unique characters inserted in the middle. However, we checked for instances of passwords that share two 3-character substrings that we did not label as partial reuse and found only two instances across our entire data set.
Passwords may be both exactly and partially reused. For example, if password1 was identi ed as a user's correct password on Website 1 and on Website 2, password1 would be considered to be exactly reused. If pass1234 then appeared on Website 3, that would mean that password1 was also partially reused, since a four-character substring of that password ("pass") appears on a di erent domain. We refer to passwords that are both exactly and partially reused as having exact-and-partial reuse. To distinguish passwords that are either exactly or partially reused but not both, we refer to only-exact and only-partial reuse.
We also introduce the notion of unique passwords, which correspond to the set of passwords belonging to a user, excluding those that are exactly reused. In the above example, the set of unique passwords is {password1, pass123}, while the set of passwords is {password1, password1, pass123} since password1 is used both on Websites 1 and 2.
Password Strength Measurement
To analyze password strength, we used an open-source implementation of a client-side model of password guessing based on neural networks [35] . e guesser was trained on publicly available password datasets to provide an estimated number of guesses (a guess number) to crack passwords of 8 to 32 characters in length.
Detection of Password Auto ll
As all browsers included in this study provide password storage or "remember" functionality, we instrumented our collection so ware to detect the number of key presses within each password eld encountered in the browser. Combining this keystroke data with our password length measurements, we distinguished the entries participants manually typed from those auto lled by either the browser or third-party password management so ware. For example, if we observed an eight-character password submi ed with zero keystrokes, then we assume the browser or some other soware provided some form of auto ll for the submission. We added this instrumentation several months weeks a er we began data collection, limiting us to approximately seven weeks of keystroke data. We collected keystroke data for 546 passwords (329 unique passwords) entered on 305 distinct domains by 90 users. Of those 546 passwords, we observed 311 being auto lled at least once, and 240 were auto lled on 100% of all observations within the period during which keystroke data was collected.
Website Categories
To determine the categories of websites on which we observed password entries, one of our researchers manually coded 1,030 domains and created a codebook of 15 website categories. We crowdsourced the coding of 1,450 additional website categories on Mechanical Turk, where three workers selected a category for each domain using our category list and coding instructions. In the 308 cases where there was not agreement between at least two of the three Mechanical Turk workers, a researcher re-coded the website category. We then used a script to combine domain names that were actually just variations of the same domain so that we could accurately assess password use within and across domains. Ultimately, we observed and analyzed password entries on 2,077 distinct domains across 154 users.
ird-Party Data
We employed third-party blacklists and databases as necessary to identify malicious or risky les, downloads, page visits, and events in the SBO dataset. In particular, for this analysis, we compared browsing data to blacklists gathered from the Google Safe Browsing API to detect downloads of dangerous programs [18] . Additionally, in order to detect malware and potentially unwanted programs present on users' computers, we compared le hashes from users' lesystems to results in VirusTotal's database, which compiles virus scan results from multiple commercial and open-source antivirus products [49] . File hashes were classi ed as malware or potentially unwanted if they were agged by 25% or more of the scanners whose results were aggregated by VirusTotal.
RESULTS
We begin by describing the demographics of our participants. Next, we provide an overview of our participants' password use and reuse behaviors, as well as the characteristics of their passwords. We describe ve password reuse behavior pa erns that we observed.
en we discuss password strength distributions and characteristics of reused passwords. Finally, we explore correlations with security behaviors and intentions.
Demographics
Our participants' ages ranged from 19 to 79, with a median of 26 and a mean of 31.5. us, our sample skews markedly younger than the general population. However, given the bias towards younger users (usually convenience samples of university students) that is commonly seen in behavioral research, including usable security and password research, the fact that this sample does include at least some older users is of value. Additionally, our sample is biased towards female users, with 60.4% of users self-identifying as female. Our participants had varying education levels, with 16.9% having completed a graduate (Master's or Doctoral) degree, 40.3% a Bachelor's degree, and 5.2% an Associate's degree as their highest levels of education. A minority of our participants (27.9% of 154) completed some college, and 8.4% completed high school or a GED.
Passwords in the Wild
We observed a total of 4,057 passwords that our 154 participants submi ed to 2,077 di erent web domains. When we count each of a participant's passwords only once, we nd 1,522 unique passwords. Table 1 provides a summary of the participants and passwords observed in this study. Table 2 shows the distribution of website domain categories to which passwords were submi ed. Figure 1 . Additionally, 14% of participants used one password that had a guess number that was at least two standard deviations or more above the mean strength of all their passwords. Half of these outlying passwords were neither exactly or partially reused.
Password
As shown in Table 2 , website categories for which these passwords were used varied; half were created for either a shopping or educational website, while others were used on social network, government, research, portal, or tech/so ware/ lesharing websites. Figure 5 shows how password reuse varies by category.
Reuse
Characteristics. e average participant used 9.88 unique passwords and submi ed passwords to 26.34 di erent web domains, resulting in a median domain-to-password ratio of 2.39. From our set of unique passwords, 1,578 in total, 511 or 32% were exactly reused. We observed partial reuse in 833 or 53% of all passwords. Combined, we observed any form of reuse in 951 or approximately 60% of all unique passwords.
We found that most participants reused the majority of their passwords on multiple accounts. As seen in Figure 2 , a quarter of our participants maintained a set of passwords in which over 90% of the passwords exhibited either partial or exact reuse. We observed exact reuse in 67% and partial reuse in 63% of the average participant's en we computed the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values of these participant means. "All Passwords" statistics include all instances of reused passwords. "Unique Passwords" statistics include each of a participant's passwords only once, regardless of how many times they were reused. Active days refer to days in which participants were observed using their main web browser. Domains per password, exact reuse password, and reused substring refer to the number of domains on which each password, reused password, or reused substring was observed. of all passwords. erefore, among partially reused passwords, the average password is related to 3.66 other passwords, by an average of 2.05 di erent substrings. As shown in Figure 3 , most partially reused passwords include a shared string of 4 to 8 characters, although some include longer shared strings. In Figure 4 , we see the distribution by length of the non-shared portion (the remaining characters that are not a part of the shared substring) of partially reused substrings. is highlights the large amount of partial reuse e mean length of non-reused substrings per participant ranged from 0.5 to 9.0, with an overall mean across participants of 3.25 characters (median = 3.08, SD = 1.81).
involving small changes of only a handful of characters with one character di erences most common (22% of partially reused passwords). We identi ed 682 instances of the substring used as a pre x (within 61% of partially reused passwords) and 530 instances of the substring used as a su x (within 52% of partially reused passwords).
ese overlap, as many partially reused passwords share substrings with more than one other password.
We also investigated whether participants tend to reuse passwords di erently within the same category of website, rather than across categories. We found, overall, that password reuse was rarely limited to a speci c category of website: only 2.64% of reused (exactly or partially) passwords were reused within the same category. Focusing speci cally on nancial websites, where passwords likely protect high-value accounts, most nancial passwords were reused and most of that reuse included reuse in di erent categories. Specifically, 85.06% of passwords used on nancial sites were reused, and 95.50% of those passwords were reused for other types of websites.
Groups of Password Reuse
To investigate the strategies people use to create passwords, we analyzed the reuse behaviors of our participants in further detail. Taking into consideration all of a user's passwords, we identi ed the proportions of their passwords that were only-exactly reused, onlypartially reused, exactly-and-partially reused, and neither exactly or partially reused. Participants were then grouped by their dominant strategy, which we determined to be the type of reuse observed for at least 50% of their passwords. We distinguished ve password reuse strategies among our participants, including a mixed strategy.
Unique Password Creators: A group of 10 (6.5%) of participants followed the strategy of creating unique passwords (neither exactly nor partially reused) for at least 50% of the passwords they created. Almost all of these participants had few online accounts and used their passwords infrequently. With the exception of one participant who had 39 online accounts, all unique password creators entered passwords on eight or fewer domains. Additionally, these participants had online activity for only an average of 17% of the days they were enrolled in the study.
Partial Password Re-users: Five people (3.2%) followed the strategy of only partially reusing passwords for at least 50% of the passwords they created. ey had, on average, four total passwords, and were active in the study for 29% of the days that they participated. Interestingly, this group generally did not exactly reuse passwords, as passwords that were only partially reused or unique accounted for 80% of this group's passwords. Exact Password Re-users: Seventeen (11%) of our participants followed the strategy of only exactly reusing a password for at least 50% of the passwords they created. ese users varied greatly in their percentage of days active online. On average, 72% of their passwords were exactly reused, and did not share substrings with their other passwords. Participants in this group maintained an average of 1.6 distinct reused passwords that were each used across an average of 9.9 di erent domains.
Exact-and-partial Password Re-users: Ninety-four (61%) of our participants had a set of passwords such that at least 50% were both exactly-and-partially reused across websites. Participants in this group were generally active online, having 32 di erent online accounts on average. Most (72%) of the passwords these participants used were both exactly-and-partially reused. On average, participants in this group had a set of 3.3 passwords which they exactly or partially reused on 7.4 di erent domains.
Mixed Strategy Users: Twenty-eight participants (18%) seemed to have mixed strategies for creating passwords, choosing to exactly reuse a password on some domains, partially reuse a password on others, exactly reuse a partially reused password, or occasionally making a unique password for the domain. ese participants were also active online, maintaining an average of 22 di erent online accounts. Passwords that exhibited any form of reuse comprised 75% of these participants' passwords, on average.
In our participant sample, we found that people who have a large number of accounts cope by reusing passwords, either consistently as "exact-and-partial password re-users" or somewhat less consistently as "mixed strategy users." Only 20% of users have a pure strategy when creating passwords (to either exactly reuse, partially reuse, or have no reuse), and those users generally have a small number of passwords.
Password Strength Distributions
Each participant is using, on average, 9.88 unique passwords. To be er understand how users select these passwords, we analyzed the distribution of password strength (expressed by its guess number) over each participant's passwords. We used the KolmogorovSmirnov test to calculate distances between distributions corresponding to di erent pairs of users. We then used hierarchical clustering based on these distances to group users into clusters with similar distributions. Hierarchical clustering converged to four clusters in which participants had similar password strength distributions. ese four clusters (1-4) contain the majority (121/154, or about 78.5%) of our users. Table 3 provides, for each cluster, summary statistics of the strengths of the passwords used. For each participant, we compute the average password strength, and then describe the distribution of these average password strengths across the entire cluster. At rst glance, Clusters 1 and 2 appear to have relatively similar, mediumto-high strength passwords; Cluster 3 users seem to pick slightly weaker passwords, and Cluster 4 users appear to use much weaker passwords. ese summary statistics, however, only tell part of the story. Widely di erent distributions may have, indeed very similar summary statistics. In Figure 7 , we plot, for each user, within each cluster, the distribution of their passwords strength. e x-axis corresponds to the logarithm in base 10 of the guess number of a given password; in other words, "10" means that the corresponding password has a guess number of 10 10 .
Cluster 1, as seen in Figure 7 , contains distributions covering nearly the complete range of strength values 0 to 10 30 . More interestingly, most of the per-user distributions appear to have a relatively narrow couple of peaks-meaning that their passwords all fall within a couple of strength tiers, the largest of which, are, for the most part, between 10 10 and 10 15 guesses.
is "multi-modal" behavior is consistent with the partial reuse we frequently observed. Namely, these multiple modes could be the result of people picking a couple of "base passwords, " and deriving their other passwords from these base passwords, resulting with similar guess numbers for all derived passwords.
Cluster 2 users, on average, pick stronger passwords than Cluster 1 users. However, we see that the peaks are much " a er, " and, overall, the distributions of passwords chosen by each user are far more spread out. Cluster 2 users may reuse less, or the modi cations they make to their base passwords could have a more drastic spread-out e ect.
Users in Cluster 3 behave very similarly to those in Cluster 1, with passwords whose strength distribution have a couple of modes; however they pick comparatively weaker passwords than users in Cluster 1.
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To summarize, Clusters 1, 3 and 4 users pick passwords that, for the most part, are centered on a couple (1-3) of strength levels. e di erence between these di erent clusters is the average strength in their respective user passwords: Cluster 1 users pick generally stronger passwords than Cluster 3 users, who in turn pick stronger passwords than Cluster 4 users. On the other hand, Cluster 2 users pick a broad range of passwords of varying strength, generally leaning toward stronger passwords.
Characteristics of Reused Passwords
We next examine the passwords we collected to determine whether there are similarities in how they are reused (Section 4.5.1); and whether reuse is a ected by passwords' syntactic properties, strength, or the categories of sites where the passwords are used (Section 4.5.2).
Clustering passwords by reuse characteristics.
We rst study whether passwords-independently of who created them-have any notable similarities based on how they are reused. In particular, we cluster passwords according to their reuse characteristics (e.g., how o en they were exactly or partially reused; whether they were reused mostly within or across categories of accounts) and then examine the clusters for pa erns.
To perform this analysis, we apply k-means clustering to all the passwords we collected. (Here, if the same password is used on two accounts, it counts as two passwords.) In this clustering, each password is described according to the following seven dimensions.
• Exact reuse: Fraction of a user's accounts on which this password was exactly reused.
• Partial reuse: Fraction of a user's accounts on which this password was partially reused.
• Entries per day: Average number of times this password was used.
• Within-category reuse: Fraction of passwords in the same category of website for which this password is used that constitute exact or partial reuse of this password.
• Other-category reuse: Average fraction of passwords used for other categories of websites that constitute exact or partial reuse of this password.
• Span of category reuse: Fraction of categories in which this password is exactly or partially reused.
• Days site visited: Fraction of days (relative to days within study) on which the user visited the user visited pages within this site (possibly without logging in). As is standard, we a empted to cluster for increasing values of k starting with k = 2, observing the change in the within-clusters sum of squares errors as k increased [28] . We used the elbow method to determine the optimal value of k [28] , which led us to cluster passwords into seven clusters, shown in Table 4 . While the clustering does not appear to reveal any intuitively signi cant high-level trends, a few clusters stand out.
Clusters 6 and 7 have the highest strengths among all the clustersthe average number of guesses needed to crack passwords in these clusters is more than a magnitude larger than it is for our overall set of passwords. Both clusters represent passwords for sites that participants visit o en (on more than 60% of days), although Cluster 6 passwords are typed in an order of magnitude times more o en (1.48 entries per day compared to 0.18 times per day).
Cluster 2 is the next in order of strength, and still substantially stronger than average for all passwords. Passwords in this cluster Table 4 : Descriptions of clusters of passwords resulting from k-means clustering with k = 7. "N" is the number of passwords in the cluster; "Part." the number of participants whose passwords are represented in the cluster; "Guess" the log of the average guess number of passwords in the cluster. Remaining columns show the length; number of characters in each character class; and average number of character classes. are reused less than Cluster 6 and 7 passwords, but most reuse (> 74%) is within the same category of website. e sites on which these passwords are used are visited less frequently than Clusters 6 and 7. e weakest cluster-4-has the highest average values for percentage of websites with exact reuse. e sites on which they are used are not frequently visited-approximately one day in 20.
Interestingly, Cluster 3-passwords that are never reused (exactly or partially)-nearly matches the average strength of the entire population.
Overall, in this case the clustering reveals few startling or denitive insights, although it does suggest a few trends (or notable absences thereof): First, with small exceptions, there seems to be li le link between reuse type and strength. e exception is that a cluster of passwords (Cluster 4) that are exactly reused much more o en than most is also by far the weakest. Second, passwords that are entered most frequently seem approximately average in terms of reuse characteristics but are much stronger than average.
Modeling password reuse.
To be er understand what factors might contribute to users' decisions to reuse or not reuse passwords, we constructed regression models that a empt to predict (1) whether passwords will be reused wholly, partially, both wholly and partially, or not at all; and (2) for passwords that are reused, how much (i.e., on how many domains) they would be reused.
Based on previous ndings regarding reuse [50] , we expected that the number of times a password was entered and password complexity and strength would be important predictors of reuse. Other factors we included in the models were the length of the password, the presence of each character class, the strength of the password, and the category of the site for which the password was used.
Explaining whether a password will be reused. Our rst model, a multi-level logistic model with intercepts permi ed to vary on the user and domain levels, a empted to explain whether a password would be reused (partially or exactly) or not. e model is shown in Table 5 .
Properties of passwords that were most strongly correlated with reuse were the presence of digits and special characters. e model suggests that the presence of at least one digit makes a password much more likely to be reused, multiplying the odds of reuse by more than 12 (odds ratio 12.30). 2 e presence of special characters also increases the odds of reuse (odds ratio 2.69). ese ndings are consistent with previous work that found that complexity was correlated with reuse [50] .
Several categories of web sites also had large but di erent e ects. e odds of reuse were tripled for passwords used on shopping sites (odds ratio 3.16). Perhaps surprisingly, the odds of reuse were also approximately tripled for passwords used on job-or work-related sites (odds ratio 3.06).
Some of the categories of websites that one might expect would have an e ect on password reuse-e.g., nancial sites, which one would expect would have more unique passwords-were not shown as signi cant in our model.
Finally, password strength was revealed as a statistically signi cant factor in predicting reuse. For each order-of-magnitude increase in the number of guesses needed to guess a password, the odds of reuse decrease by approximately ∼9% (odds ratio 0.91). In other words, the odds of reuse for a password that is one order of magnitude stronger than average would be 91% of the odds of reuse of a password of average strength, and the odds of reuse for a password that is three orders of magnitude stronger than average would be 75.4% of the odds for a password of average strength. is is unlike previous work, where a di erent measure of password strength was found to be positively correlated with reuse [50] .
Explaining extent of reuse. Additionally, we developed a linear multi-level model to a empt to predict, for reused passwords only, the number of domains on which the password would be reused.
is model had intercepts varying on domain and user and, besides variables included in the logistic model, also included multiple userlevel variables, including whether a user was a student, educational level, gender, programming language knowledge, and age. is model is described in Table 6 .
Among the subset of passwords that are partially or exactly reused (the dataset on which this regression was run), passwords with digits are likely to be reused on more domains. Among reused A number of other factors each made passwords likely to be reused on fewer domains. Longer passwords tended to be reused on fewer domains. Stronger passwords, more-frequently-entered passwords, and passwords containing uppercase le ers also tended to be reused on fewer domains, but the e ects of these variables were quite small. e category of website on which the password was used also sometimes had a small e ect: passwords used on portals or on educational, nancial, or government sites were all likely to be reused on fewer domains overall.
Correlations with Other Security Behaviors
e SBO reports data on general security behavior, such as the presence of security extensions (e.g., password managers, antiviruses) or suspected malware. Table 7 shows the security behavior a ributes we analyzed for our study participants. We used this data in conjunction with password-related outcomes-i.e., whether a password was unique or reused, the number of domains a password was reused on, and password strength-to determine if we can predict user behavior with respect to passwords from other security behaviors. 4.6.1 Predicting Reuse with Other Security Behaviors. We rst ran a multi-level logistic regression to a empt to predict simply whether a password would be reused (exactly or partially) or not.
To that e ect, the dependent variable in the logistic model in Table 8 is a binary variable ("reuse") which is coded to 1 if a password is partially or exactly reused, and 0 otherwise.
Since we did not have auto ll detection data for all password inputs, this regression model and the others below examine a smaller subset of our password data, comprised of 546 passwords (329 unique passwords) entered on 305 distinct domains by 90 users.
We included ve di erent security behavior variables: whether the user had a password manager, whether they had security-or privacy-related browser extensions, whether they had assented to downloading programs agged as dangerous (according to the Google Safe Browsing API), whether malware or adware was detected on the machine (using data from VirusTotal) at some point during the observation period, and the percentage of total entries of the password that were performed with auto ll (rather than by manually typing the password). As shown in Table 8 , no factors in this model are statistically signi cant predictors of whether a password will be reused. We wondered whether the user's amount of web browsing could be an omi ed variable that might explain other factors including presence of malware (due to increased exposure) and might also a ect password reuse and other aspects of password behavior. us, we constructed a model that also included average navigations
User's Average Number of Daily Page Visits Number of Domains on which Password is Reused Figure 8 : Relationship between user's average daily page visits and number of domains on which a password is reused (for all partially-or exactly-reused passwords).
observed per day (which was calculated as total page visits observed divided by days of observation) as a regressor.
e results, shown in Table 9 , indicate that the average number of page visits per day was a signi cant predictor of reuse. An increase in the log10 value of the user's average navigations per day (e.g., increasing average navigations per day from 100 to 1000) would more than triple the odds of password reuse (odds ratio 3.56).
We also constructed a linear model to a empt to predict, for reused passwords, the number of domains that they would be reused on.
In a model with the four security behaviors plus average daily navigations, summarized in Table 10 , the number of average daily navigations is again the only variable indicated to be statistically signi cant with p < 0.05. An one-increment increase in the log10 value of the user's average number of daily page visits (e.g., increasing average navigations per day from 100 to 1000) would predict an increase of 0.41 in the number of domains on which a given password belonging to that user would be reused. e plot in Figure 8 depicts the relationship between the user's average daily page visits and the number of domains on which a password is reused.
Predicting Password Strength with Other Security Behaviors.
In addition to measuring possible correlations between security behaviors and password reuse, we also constructed a linear multilevel model that a empts to predict password strength based on security behaviors. Results from this model are shown below in Table 11 .
e presence of a password manager did not have a statistically signi cant predictive e ect on password strength in either model, nor did the percentage of entries of the password that were performed with auto ll. e detection of dangerous downloads, the presence of securityor privacy-related browser extensions, the detection of malware on a user's machine, and the average number of navigations per day also did not have signi cant predictive e ects on password strength.
DISCUSSION
Our results show that password reuse-in both exact and partial form-is extremely rampant. Participants in our study have passwords for 26.3 web domains on average, and they appear to deal with the problem of creating and recalling these passwords by partially or exactly reusing approximately 80% of their passwords across domains. While previous work had found high rates of exact password reuse [11, 50] , our study suggests that the problem may be even worse that previously thought when partial reuse is taken into account. We observe that on average 16% of a participant's passwords are exactly reused, 12% are partially reused, and an additional 51% are both exactly and partially reused. us many participants have clusters of both partially and exactly reused passwords that share common substrings.
Most participants (122 users, 79.2%) adopted hybrid strategies incorporating both exact and partial reuse in order to manage their passwords. Some participants did display simpler strategies of password reuse: 6.5% of participants mostly used unique passwords, 3.2% mostly partially reused passwords, and 11% mostly exactly reused passwords. However, those participants tended to have lower levels of activity and fewer accounts. Participants with larger numbers of accounts tended to either exactly-and-partially reuse their passwords or to employ mixed strategies, presumably in order to cope with the memory demands of their larger password portfolios.
Password managers are increasingly recommended to help users generate random and unique passwords for a large number of accounts [7, 38] . However, similar to Wash et al., we found no statistically signi cant e ect of the presence of a password manager or the use of auto ll functionality on the frequency of password reuse. We also found no statistically signi cant e ect of the presence of a password manager or the use of auto ll on password strength.
However, we observed only 19 participants who had installed password managers, and although we were able to observe whether some passwords were auto lled, we were not able to determine whether those were auto lled by third-party password managers or by native browser functionality. We are also unable to account for any users that may be accessing password managers on their mobile devices or for whether users were utilizing the password generator functions of their password managers.
If participants are using password managers of any kind to randomly generate and store most of their passwords, we would expect those participants to have consistently strong passwords and very li le password reuse. e only participants in our data set with li le password reuse had a small number of passwords. us we suspect that participants are either not using password managers, or using them only to store the passwords they create themselves rather than to generate and store random passwords. Further investigation is needed to determine whether password managers are able to e ectively serve users' needs and relieve the memory demands of modern password portfolios while also encouraging higher security. Changes to password managers may be needed to be er facilitate their use as random password generators for non-expert users. Our research and Wash et al. 's ndings both suggest that password managers may not be panaceas in their current forms.
Based on previous ndings regarding password reuse [50] , we expected that frequency of password entry would be an important predictor of reuse. is was not con rmed by our models. Furthermore, the model shown in Table 6 indicates that more frequently entered passwords were actually reused with slightly less frequency, although this e ect size is small. In addition, while previous work found that password strength as measured by entropy is positively correlated with reuse, we found that password strength as measured by guessability does not positively correlate with reuse; in fact, we nd a weak negative correlation. e properties we found most strongly positively correlated with password reuse were the presence of digits and special characters. However, we also found that stronger passwords were less likely to be reused. We speculate that passwords that contain digits and special characters lend themselves to reuse because they are likely to satisfy password policies on more domains than passwords without digits or special characters. However, the mere presence of digits and special characters does not necessarily ensure that a password is strong, especially when those digits or special characters are placed in predictable locations. Stronger passwords are generally longer and contain digits, capital le ers, and special characters in unpredictable places, which may make them harder to remember or type. It is also possible that users create stronger passwords for accounts they value more, and thus they choose not to reuse them as o en.
We also found some e ects of website category on password reuse. Passwords used on government websites tended to be reused on fewer domains, which may be because users consider government websites more important in terms of security or may also be related to relatively stringent password composition or expiration requirements on government websites. More surprisingly, we found that passwords used on shopping and job search websites are more likely to be reused and are reused on larger numbers of domains. is is somewhat surprising considering that shopping website passwords may protect sensitive credit card data and that job-and work-related sites may contain other information that users might want to keep secure, such as payroll and employment information.
Past work has shown that users cope with the unreasonable memory demands imposed by advice to create unique, strong passwords in part by reusing passwords.
Here, by observing a relatively diverse sample of users on their own home computers, in their natural environments, we are able to observe unprecedented detail regarding users' reuse strategies.
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